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Abstract 
In this study, we examine the determinants of the yield spread between issuers in Japan’s 
municipal bond market using panel data and focus on identifying whether credit risk 
premium exists. The results of the panel data analysis reveal new evidence on the municipal 
bond market for FY 2002–2013. In the first half of the 2000s, the fundamental fiscal statistics, 
that is, the credit risk indicators, had no impact on the yield spreads, suggesting the absence 
of credit risk premium. Second, Yūbari city’s insolvency in 2006 led to a structural break and 
since then, investors have begun accounting for local governments’ outstanding debt. Third, 
when important financial events occur, other credit risk indicators also significantly impact 
the yield spread, suggesting that during such events, investors are more aware of credit risk 
presence. Finally, the findings of this study provide implications for, perhaps, financial 
institutions, market participants, regulators. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Japan, the largest municipal bond market among unitary states 
Factors determining the yield level of public bonds are a topic an issue that has thrust its 
way into the public consciousness of the global financial market. The 2010 public financial 
collapse in Greece led to the European sovereign debt crisis, which not only triggered unrest 
about the default probability of Greece’s public bonds but also impacted other countries such 
as Spain, Portugal, and Italy. In the United States, the 2008 global financial crisis severely 
damaged state and local public finances and led to numerous financial problems, such as the 
Detroit bankruptcy and the insolvency of Illinois’ state pension funds. In fact, the recent news 
that the Puerto Rican government missed its municipal bond payments has taken many 
investors in the global financial market by surprise. 
In this study, we examine the yield determinants of sub-sovereign bonds. In particular, we 
attempt to answer the following questions. Do investors believe that sub-sovereign bonds are 
subject to credit risk? Does their evaluation reflect the sub-sovereign bond yield as credit risk 
premium? Thereby, does the yield spread between the issuers reflect their fiscal soundness or 
credit risk? In other words, is the so-called “market discipline” present in the sub-sovereign 
market? 
Several preliminary analyses share the aims of this study. The distinguishing characteristic 
of our analysis, however, is that we focus on Japan’s municipal bond market1. Today, few 
scholars discuss the bond market primarily because of language barriers and difficulties in 
accessing statistical data, thus leading to an important sector in Japan with meaningful insight 
being largely overlooked. 
In fact, the scale of Japan’s municipal bond market is large in advanced countries. It is 
widely known that Japan’s outstanding public debt as a percentage of GDP is now more than 
200% and dominates that of other advanced countries. Japanese local governments are not 
isolated from this situation. As of 2013, the outstanding municipal debt, comprising debt 
loans and bonds, owned by Japanese local governments is $1.7 trillion (Figure 1), which is 
the second highest among advanced countries following the United States.  
  
                                                        
1 See Igata and Miyake (2007) and Miyake (2008) for a detailed discussion of the Japanese municipal debt 
market and relevant local public finance institutions. 
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Undoubtedly, Japan’s municipal bond market, excluding debt loans, is significantly 
smaller. This is because about 60% of municipal debt consists of loans issued by private 
commercial banks through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FLIP), which is 
managed by the central government. However, in terms of the scale of municipal bond 
market, the United States and Canada, where the state and local governments borrow money 
mainly by issuing bonds, rank higher than Japan, followed by Germany, where about 60% of 
municipal debts are in the form of bonds. 
 
1.2. Credit risk of municipal bonds in unitary states 
It is noteworthy that all countries with a municipal bond market exceeding $500 billion 
(e.g., the United States, Germany, and Canada) adopt a federal system, except Japan. In a 
federal state, state governments have the sovereign power, and the role and discretion of the 
state government in public finance management are relatively large. This also holds true 
when issuing municipal debt, and thus, it seems natural that the scale of the municipal bond 
Figure 1: Outstanding Municipal Debt in Advanced Countries 
 
Notes: The data are as for 2013.  
Source: OECD.Stat (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx). 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
0  
500  
1,000  
1,500  
2,000  
2,500  
3,000  
3,500  
4,000  
United 
States 
Japan Germany Canada Spain France Italy United 
Kingdom 
Amount (Left Axis) % of GDP (Right Axis) 
($ Billion) (%)
  4 
market in a federal state is so large. Most of the extant literature focuses on the yield 
determinants of municipal bonds in federal states, mainly those in the United States 
(Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom, 1995; Brune and Liu, 2011), Canada (Booth, 
Georgopoulos, and Hejazi, 2007; Landon and Smith, 2000), and Germany (Heppeke-Falk and 
Wolff, 2008). 
In contrast to these three countries, Japan adopts a unitary system. In a unitary state, the 
central government decides the fundamental characteristics and role of the local government 
in public finance. The discretion of the local government, including that concerning the 
issuance of municipal debt, is relatively small. In addition, the local government receives 
substantial funds from the central government through special grants and fiscal equalization 
systems and its revenue is dependent on these funding systems. Thus, the relationship 
between the central and local governments in a unitary state is generally closer than that in a 
federal state. 
This close relationship also involves the so-called “implicit government guarantee,” which 
possibly effects the yield of municipal bonds, and especially, the existence of credit risk 
premium. Similar to the federal state, the primary responsibility to pay debt service in the 
unitary state is held by the local government as an issuer. In general, the central government 
does not share this responsibility or explicitly guarantee the debt service of municipal bonds. 
However, when a local government faces deteriorating fiscal conditions and finds it difficult 
to repay its own debt, the central government may sometimes provide an extraordinary grant 
as an ex-post bailout, which is known as the implicit government guarantee. If the 
expectation of such a guarantee exists in the market, it will reflect on the yield level of 
municipal bonds. More concretely, the credit risk premium of municipal bonds would 
disappear and their yield level would almost equal that of government bonds. The difference 
in the yield level of municipal bonds by the local government would also disappear or be 
determined by the degree of bailout possibility, not fiscal conditions (Jenkner and Lu, 2014; 
Landon and Smith, 2000). 
Therefore, in terms of yield determinants and existence of credit risk premium (or implicit 
government guarantee), the characteristics of the municipal bond market in a unitary state 
differ from those in a federal state. This is particularly the case in the United States, where 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Act for Local Governments exists and cases of the municipal 
bond default are not rare. To empirically examine such a possibility in a unitary state in the 
context of a public bond market is an interesting research topic. Thus, we focus on Japan, the 
largest among advanced unitary states, to provide meaningful insight into the bond market. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
preliminary literature on the yield determinants in municipal bond markets. Section 3 
presents the estimation equation and the sample data used in our estimations. Sections 4 and 
5 report the results and implications of our empirical analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
The literature mainly comprises studies on municipal bond markets in federal states, such 
as those in the United States. Many studies on credit risk premiums highlight the significance 
of local governments’ fiscal soundness as a determinant of the municipal bond yield in both 
primary and secondary markets. For example, Capeci (1994) finds that the current decision 
making of a local government about issuing municipal bonds affects their yield. Bayoumi, 
Goldstein, and Woglom (1995) reveal a nonlinear relationship between the states’ 
outstanding debt and municipal bond yields, that is, the higher a state government’s debt 
accumulates, the more rapidly municipal bond yield rises. Capeci (1991), Liu and Thakor 
(1984), and Stover (1991), among others, focus on the effects of credit ratings as a credit risk 
indicator on municipal bonds. Their studies are based on the fact that state and local 
governments in the United States generally purchase credit ratings, in contrast to those in 
Japan and advanced European countries. 
Some studies examine the effects of financial events on the municipal bond market, such 
as New York City’s fiscal emergency in the 1970s (Kidwell and Trzcinka, 1982; Kidwell and 
Trzcinka, 1983), and the default of municipal bonds (Halstead, Hegde, and Klein, 2004; 
Peavy III and Hempel, 1987). Peng, Kriz, and Wang (2014) find that the 2007–2009 Great 
Recession had some impact on the municipal bond market and that the effects differ between 
high- and low-rated municipal bonds. 
Analyses have also been conducted on the municipal bond market in the United States and 
various factors affecting bond yield, such as fiscal institutions, debt management policies, 
public accounting, financial disclosure practices, issuers’ financial sophistication, and sales 
type. Some recent studies examine liquidity risk premium or trading costs in the municipal 
bond market (Downing and Zhang, 2004; Harris and Piwowar, 2006; Wang, Wu, and Zhang, 
2008). 
By contrast, studies on Japan’s municipal bond market are limited to Nakazato (2011) and 
Tanaka (2013). While Nakazato (2011) asserts the existence of credit risk premium in Japan, 
Tanaka (2013) shows that not all fiscal statistics affect yield spreads.  
Similarly, this study examines whether investors believe in the default possibility of a 
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municipal bond and account for a local government’s fiscal soundness. However, we 
drastically improve the estimation in the following manner. First, we use simpler and 
fundamental fiscal data as credit risk indicators. Nakazato (2011) and Tanaka (2013) exclude 
variables such as simple fiscal surplus and primary balance, which are often used in practices 
in Japan’s local public finance and adopted as independent variables in previous studies on 
the public bond market. Instead, they use secondary variables, such as current surplus ratio, 
which neglects capital revenue and expenditure2.  
Second, we estimate a fixed effects model using the strength of the panel data. While 
Tanaka (2013) includes individual effects in the model, Nakazato (2011) does not. 
Accounting for individual effect allows us to capture each local government’s time-consistent 
characteristics, in addition to time-varying fiscal data, that affect municipal bond yield. 
Third, we focus on the possibility of a spurious regression by conducting unit root tests. By 
contrast, Nakazato (2011) does not conduct such a test and Tanaka (2013) performs only an 
LLC test (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002). However, as will be explained later, we suspect that the 
yield spread of Japan’s municipal bond relative to government bonds, which the two studies 
adopt as a dependent variable, can follow a unit root. Thus, their estimation results can be 
derived from a spurious regression. 
Finally, we extend the sample term from FY 2002 to FY 2013 to include the 2007–2009 
Great Recession, whereas Nakazato (2011) and Tanaka (2013) focus on FY 2003–2006 and 
FY 2003–2008. 
 
3. Estimation equation and data 
3.1. Specifying the estimation equation 
In this study, we conduct an empirical study of the yield determinants in Japan’s municipal 
bond market. In particular, we focus on the yield difference between local governments. To 
do so, we follow Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2012) and estimate the equation for 
fiscal year t: 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑! ! = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦! ! + 𝛽! 𝐿! ! + 𝛃𝟑! 𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏  +𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑌𝑆 𝛾! 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦! ! + 𝛾! 𝐿! ! + 𝛄𝟑! 𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏  +𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐿𝑆 𝛿! 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦! ! + 𝛿! 𝐿! ! + 𝛅𝟑! 𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏 + 𝜆! + 𝜇! + 𝜀! ! , … (1) 
where 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑! ! is the yield spread of the municipal bond issued by local government i, 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦! ! is the term to maturity, and 𝐿! ! is the measure of liquidity. 𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏  contains 
                                                        
2 We separately conduct estimations using such variables in Equations (1) and (2) and find that the results 
remain unchanged. 
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the independent variables related to credit risk. 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑌𝑆 and 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐿𝑆 are financial 
event dummies. 𝜇! denotes the unobservable individual effect and 𝜆! is the unobservable 
time effect, which allows us to estimate the fixed effects model using dummy variables3. 𝜀! ! 
is an error term.  
The equation highlights the following two points. First, the dependent variable 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑! ! 
is defined as a deviation from the municipal bond market index, instead of the government 
bond yield. The literature on bond yield determinants generally uses a spread relative to 
government bonds. However, in the case of Japan’s municipal bond market, the spread 
relative to government bonds can also follow the unit root process (Table 1). By contrast, the 
spread relative to the municipal bond index does not follow the unit root process. We are 
mainly interested in whether credit risk exists and if the fiscal soundness of each local 
government affects the municipal bond yield. Thus, we focus on the yield difference between 
local governments and find no difference between yield spreads relative to government bonds 
and municipal bond market indexes (Benson and Rogowski, 1978; Goldstein and Woglom, 
1991). As a result, we adopt the latter as a dependent variable to eliminate the possibility of a 
spurious regression. 
  
                                                        
3 We conducted an F-test and Hausman test to determine the model (i.e., pooled-OLS, random effects model, or 
fixed effects model) using the entire sample. The null hypotheses for both tests were rejected. 
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Second, we carefully consider the timing of data announcements related to local public 
finance. We set the independent variables related to fiscal data (𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏 ) lagged by one year 
Table 1: Unit Root Test Results 
 
Notes: 1. p-values are shown in parentheses. 
2. We conduct three tests: an IPS (Im, Pesaran, and Shin, 2003), LLC (Levin, Lin, and Chu, 2002), and 
augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF; Maddala and Wu, 1999) test. 
3. Information criteria (BIC) are applied to select lag length. 
4. As for yield spreads, maturity, and issue amount, we conduct two unit root tests on the sample data 
collected because they differ between the end of December and that of March. 
Variables
Date of Sample
Yield Spread
Sample Term
FY2002
- 13
FY2006
- 13
FY2002
- 13
FY2006
- 13
FY2002
- 13
FY2006
- 13
FY2002
- 13
FY2006
- 13
1.4055 2.7899 0.6443 1.9309 -12.1318 -5.6796 -1.7317 -4.3097
(0.9201) (0.9974) (0.7403) (0.9733) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0417) (0.0000)
1.6198 -0.8335 -1.5201 -3.2015 -15.2106 -13.2562 -4.0866 -10.3979
(0.9474) (0.2023) (0.0642) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
22.6903 13.1836 28.3057 18.5674 211.0370 141.6490 60.2388 117.3000
(0.9993) (1.0000) (0.9895) (1.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1106) (0.0000)
Variables
Date of Sample
Yield Spread
Sample Term
FY2002
- 13
FY2006
- 13
FY2002
- 13
FY2006
- 13
FY2002
- 13
FY2006
- 13
FY2002
- 13
FY2006
- 13
-33.6606 -14.9584 -6.8579 -70.7861 -4.3588 -1.3427 -3.2037 -2.3E+14
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0897) (0.0007) (0.0000)
-124.8230 -65.5595 -18.1135 -459.4220 -7.7154 -3.5372 -6.3864 -3.5485
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002)
165.7240 134.0690 115.9010 163.6670 92.4254 38.2278 79.3323 47.2395
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0577) (0.0016) (0.0651)
Variables
Sample Term
FY2002
- 13
FY2006
- 13
FY2002
- 13
FY2006
- 13
FY2002
- 13
FY2006
- 13
FY2002
- 13
FY2006
- 13
-3.7902 -5.1564 -2.6410 -1.4630 -5.6061 -2.8750 -2.2063 -10.5020
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0041) (0.0717) (0.0000) (0.0020) (0.0137) (0.0000)
-7.2041 -15.8195 -4.6877 -9.9785 -7.5754 -7.4611 -4.9082 -37.8493
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
88.2492 125.2280 69.0644 69.7351 121.4690 91.0002 68.1809 129.2910
(0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0248) (0.0339) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0292) (0.0000)
IPS Test
LLC Test
ADF Test
LLC Test
ADF Test
Real Surplus Ratio Primary Balance Ratio MDO Ratio Debt Service Ratio
IPS Test
IPS Test
LLC Test
ADF Test
Maturity Issue Amount
December 31 March 31 December 31 March 31
Yield Spread
Relative to Central Government Bond
Yield Spread
Relative to Municipal Bond Index
December 31 March 31 December 31 March 31
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and use the sample data of the yield spread for the end of December and that of March4. for 
each fiscal year. To ensure that we use complete balance panel data, we adopt one dataset for 
each local government per year, including the yield spread5. Thus, when deriving the sample 
data for the yield spread, we chose one business day in each year. It is natural to assume that 
the spread would react immediately after new fiscal data announcements if such information 
had an impact. In the case of local public finance institutions in Japan, there are two instances 
in which investors get data on the fiscal year (t − 1): the end of December or that of March in 
the following fiscal year t6. Thus, we selected two days in each fiscal year and lagged the 
timing of the fiscal data in 𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏 . We also conduct two types of estimations, which 
contribute to checking the robustness of our analysis. 
 
3.2. Sample data and data resources 
Next, we describe the dataset. Detail definitions and data sources of each variable are 
presented in Table 2. 
  
                                                        
4 Note that the dates for which data are adopted differ by year; that is, in some years, the last day of both 
months (December 31 and March 31) are non-business days. In such cases, we sample data for the previous 
day. Hereinafter, we refer to all such sets of dates as “end of December and that of March”. 
5 The yield (spread) of municipal bonds is available on a daily basis, whereas fiscal data on Japan’s local 
government are released annually.  
6 The schedule of data announcements for local public finance is as follows: the fiscal year spans from April 1 
to March 31. Data on local public finance are uniformly arranged by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (MIC). Investors can access this information through, for example, MIC’s website. For 
example, investor can access brief data for FY 2006 (April 2006–March 2007) by December 2007 and 
detailed data by March 2008. 
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Table 2: Details and Data Resources of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Notes: * denotes variables included in 𝐱𝐢 𝐭!𝟏  in Equation (2). 
 
Notes: 1. p-values are shown in parentheses. 
2. We conduct three tests: an IPS (Im, Pesaran, and Shin, 2003), LLC (Levin, Lin, and Chu, 2002), and 
augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF; Maddala and Wu, 1999) test. 
3. Information criteria (BIC) are applied to select lag length. 
4. As for yield spreads, maturity, and issue amount, we conduct two unit root tests on the sample data 
Definition Data Sources
 Yield Spread of
Municipal Bonds
Yield of publicly offered municipal bonds in the secondary
market
−Municipal bond market yield benchmark index
* "Municipal bond market yield benchmark index" is
NOMURA-BPI Municipals (municipal bond market yield
index)
Japan Securities Dealers Association (JSDA),
Reference Statistical Prices (Yields) for OTC
Bond Transactions, Nomura Securities Co., Ltd.,
NOMURA-BPI Municipals (municipal bond
market yield index)
1) Maturity (Maturity) Year to maturity JSDA, Reference Statistical Prices (Yields) for
OTC Bond Transactions
2) Liquidity Risk Index
(L)
Issue amount JSDA, Reference Statistical Prices (Yields) for
OTC Bond Transactions
 Real Surplus Ratio Actual surplus / general financial resource
* Actual surplus = revenue - expenditure
* General financial resource is defined as the general
current revenue and each local government decides its use.
MIC calculates statistics and uses them to understand the
fiscal scale of each local government.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
(MIC), Statistical Yearbook on Local Public
Finance (Chiho-Zaisei Tokei Nenpo)
 Primary Balance Ratio Primary balance / general financial resource
* Primary balance = (revenue - debt finance funds)
 − (expenditure - debt service)
MIC, Statistical Yearbook on Local Public
Finance (Chiho-Zaisei Tokei Nenpo)
 Municipal Debt
Outstanding
(MDO) Ratio
Municipal debt outstanding / general financial resource
"Municipal debt" includes not only publicly offered
municipal bonds but also loan debts through FILP, bank
loans, and the private placement bond.
Japan Local Government Bond (JLGB)
Association, Statistical Yearbook on Municipal
Debt (Chihosai Tokei Nenpo), MIC, Statistical
Yearbook on Local Public Finance (Chiho-Zaisei
Tokei Nenpo)
 Debt Service Ratio Debt service / general financial resource MIC, Statistical Yearbook on Local Public
Finance (Chiho-Zaisei Tokei Nenpo).
 Real Deficit Ratio () Actual deficit (expenditure - revenue) / general financial
resource
 If the fiscal balance of a local government is in surplus,
this ratio is not calculated. Thus, when we use this ratio in
the estimation, we convert it into dummy variables, that is,
1 if this ratio has a value, and 0 if it is not calculated (fiscal
balance is surplus).
MIC, MIC website
(http://www.soumu.go.jp/iken/zaisei/kenzenka/in
dex.html)
 Consolidated Real
Deficit Ratio ()
Sum of actual deficit (expenditure - revenue) of the
ordinary, special, and public enterprise accounts / general
financial resource
 Similar to the real deficit ratio, we convert this ratio to
dummy variables.
MIC, MIC website
(http://www.soumu.go.jp/iken/zaisei/kenzenka/in
dex.html)
 Real Debt Service
Ratio ()
Debt service (which the issuer is responsible for)
 / general financial resource
 This has been calculated by MIC since FY 2006 and
differs from debt service ratio. Debt service in the
calculation of the real debt service ratio excludes debt
service funded by the central government or other local
governments through the fiscal equalization system and
special grants.
MIC, MIC website
(http://www.soumu.go.jp/iken/zaisei/kenzenka/in
dex.html)
 Future Burden
Ratio ()
Consolidated debt service / local government's financial
revenue resource (based on general financial resource)
MIC, MIC website
(http://www.soumu.go.jp/iken/zaisei/kenzenka/in
dex.html)
3)  Credit Risk Index (z or x)
Variables
Dependent Variables (Spread)
Independent Variables
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To compute 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑! !, we estimated the difference between the yield of publicly offered 
municipal bonds and NOMURA-BPI Municipals. Here, we use the yield determined in the 
secondary market; we assume that yields based on the secondary market reflect investors’ 
views more accurately than those based on issue7. We adopt data for publicly offered 
municipal bonds in Japan on the basis of data availability and those more actively traded than 
other municipal bonds8. The latter indicates that the yield of publicly offered municipal bonds 
reflects risk evaluation by investors more precisely.  
An issuer generally trades two or more issues in the publicly offered municipal bond 
market every business day. We select data on the basis of such issuers as follows for the end 
of December and that of March in each fiscal year as follows. First, to conduct a balance 
panel data analysis, we limit the scope of issuers to local governments that have regularly 
issued bonds (annually) throughout the estimation period. Second, from these, we chose a 
local government with issues whose current maturity is closest to 10 years, which is the 
typical maturity period in Japan’s municipal bond primary market. 
Next, we describe the independent variables included in Equation (1). We used term to 
maturity (𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦! !) as the characteristic variable of each bond issue9 and issue amount as 
a liquidity risk indicator (𝐿! !). We used several fiscal statistics for credit risk indicators 
(𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏 )10. The real surplus or primary balance ratios are included as flow-based indicators. 
Both indicate the surplus or deficit of local governments in each fiscal year. The municipal 
debt outstanding (MDO) ratio and debt service ratio are variables that allow us to gauge the 
scale of debt owned by each local government. These four variables are ratios relative to 
financial resources, which are general measures representing the fiscal size of each local 
government in Japan. Using the ratio variables, instead of absolute data, allows us to capture 
local governments’ fiscal difficulty within its own scale. 
Finally, we use data from FY 2002, the year since yield sample data are available, to FY 
                                                        
7 A reason underlying this assumption is that, in Japan, all municipal bonds were issued with the same yields 
every month till August 2006. Until then, MIC, a representative of municipal bond issuers, negotiated issue 
conditions with financial institutions for all bonds issued in the same month. 
8 As mentioned, Japanese local governments borrow money through bonds (municipal bonds) or loans. 
However, we exclude the following bonds from our analysis: private-placement bonds issued mainly to 
banks; joint local government bonds, which are cooperatively issued by two or more local governments; and 
mini bonds, offered to local people and enterprises. 
9 Almost all publicly offered municipal bonds, including issues in our estimations, are irredeemable and fixed 
rate bonds. Similar to advanced countries in Europe, a revenue bond has not yet been issued till date in 
Japan’s municipal bond market. Thus, the main characteristic that differs between issues is maturity. 
10 Note that we do not use credit rating as a credit risk indicator. Undoubtedly, credit ratings are widely used in 
empirical analyses on credit risk in municipal and corporate bonds. However, few local governments in Japan 
have been rated by international rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services or Moody’s 
Investors Service. In addition, the credit rating in the municipal bond market rarely fluctuates; thus, the data 
are not suitable for a panel data analysis. 
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2013, the latest year in which fiscal data of the previous fiscal year are presented. 
 
3.3. Events affecting municipal bond yield 
We account for two financial events by adding event dummies: the Yūbari shock and Great 
Recession or Lehman Shock. 
In 2006, Yūbari city in Hokkaido Prefecture became insolvent and declared a public 
finance emergency, an event widely known as the Yūbari shock. Since then, the city has 
initiated a fiscal reconstruction process under the central government’s administration. The 
city has a small local government and remains inexperienced in issuing public offered bonds. 
However, we consider the Yūbari case as an unprecedented event in Japan’s municipal bond 
market for three reasons. First, it is rare for local governments to be part of a reconstruction 
process. Second, the event raised concerns about the fiscal condition of the local governments 
among not only investors but also the general public. Finally, as a result of the event, the 
central government considered introducing a bankruptcy act that would be available to local 
governments wanting to restructure their debt burden. 
The Yūbari shock could have two possible effects on the municipal bond market. First is a 
temporary effect. In June 2007, the central government passed the Law Relating to the 
Financial Soundness of Local Governments11, which aimed at understanding the fiscal 
condition of each local government more precisely and in a timely manner and providing 
mechanisms for local governments facing fiscal difficulties. As for bankruptcy, the central 
government did not add a clause that admits local governments to debt adjustment, which 
could have relieved investors’ concern about default risks in municipal bonds. To check if 
such a temporary shock existed, we include the dummy variable 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑌𝑆 and its 
intersection with other independent variables in Equation (1). We set 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑌𝑆 to 1 from 
June 2006 to June 2007. 
Second, the shock possibly led to structural changes in Japan’s municipal bond market; for 
example, the event changed yield (spread) determinants, such as credit risk premiums. To 
check for this possibility, we conduct the estimation by dividing the sample data between 
May and June 2006. 
The Lehman Shock refers to a global financial market crisis or the Great Recession caused 
by the Lehman Brothers’ filing of bankruptcy. We set August 2007, when the BNP Paribas 
shock occurred and the subprime loan market in the United States collapsed, as the start time 
                                                        
11 For a detailed discussion of this law, see Miyake (2008). 
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for 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐿𝑆, which takes the value of 1. The end of this event is set to December 2009, 
when the spread between the NOMURA-BPI Municipals and government bond yield 
converged to the level reported before the BNP Paribas shock (Figure 2).  
 
4. Estimation results 
Equation (1) is estimated using OLS and robust standard errors. Table 3 shows the results 
for two estimations according to the date of the sample yield spread (i.e., the end of 
December and that of March), three estimations as per the sample term (FY 2002–2013, FY 
2002–2005, and FY 2006–2013), and two estimations are based on flow-base fiscal statistics 
used as an independent variable (estimation types A and B).  
 
  
Figure 2: NOMURA-BPI Municipal T-Spread Index Trend 
 
Source: Nomura Securities Co., Ltd. 
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 Table 3(i): Estimation Results for Equation (1)  
 
 
Notes: * denotes variables included in 𝐱𝐢 𝐭!𝟏  in Equation (2). 
 
 
Date of Sample Yield Spread
Sample Term
Estimation Type A B A B A B
0.1808 0.2649 0.6853 0.6467 0.2004 0.2141
(0.3715) (0.3883) (0.3315) (0.3328) (1.4853) (1.2794)
-0.0004 0.0018 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0013 0.0000
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0035) (0.0037)
0.4888 -0.4286 0.2933
(0.2053) (0.3449) (0.3956)
0.0347 -0.0079 0.1220
(0.0304) (0.0121) (0.0367)
0.2851 0.5207 0.1602 0.1233 2.0445 2.6289
(0.3386) (0.3481) (0.5569) (0.7859) (0.8134) (0.8503)
0.3835 -6.2308 -7.7300 -6.4604 -6.9135 -15.1658
(3.4495) (4.8297) (5.7029) (5.1802) (7.5084) (8.3629)
5.1064 4.6627 4.8414 4.1549
(2.8233) (2.6069) (2.7868) (2.4206)
-0.0024 -0.0015 -0.0017 0.0004
(0.0054) (0.0047) (0.0028) (0.0033)
-0.5504 -0.7596
(0.5367) (0.3145)
-0.0918 -0.1951
(0.0839) (0.0683)
0.0117 -0.0344 -0.5238 -0.2240
(0.4229) (0.4180) (0.3489) (0.3359)
7.0316 19.2823 13.5431 29.1775
(3.1828) (9.3502) (7.0455) (8.6414)
-5.0425 -4.5344 -5.0957 -5.2692
(2.9697) (2.9310) (3.4451) (3.2255)
0.0163 0.0071 0.0100 0.0091
(0.0061) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0040)
-1.4344 -0.8432
(0.5021) (0.3290)
-0.0148 -0.0949
(0.0432) (0.0405)
0.0853 -0.0289 -0.4510 -0.2059
(0.3452) (0.3542) (0.3183) (0.3001)
15.7011 17.0095 13.8128 19.5566
(9.5643) (10.0730) (9.2270) (9.6582)
N 288 288 96 96 216 216
R-squared 0.8660 0.8582 0.9523 0.9512 0.8787 0.8785
December-31
FY2002 - FY2013 FY2002 - FY2005 FY2006 - FY2013
Maturity
Issue Amount
Primary Balance Ratio
Real Surplus Ratio
MDO Ratio
Debt Service Ratio
Dummy YS
* Maturity
Dummy YS
* Issue Amount
Dummy YS
* Real Surplus Ratio
Dummy YS
* Primary Balance Ratio
Dummy YS
* MDO Ratio
Dummy YS
* Debt Service Ratio
Dummy LS
* Maturity
Dummy LS
* Issue Amount
Dummy LS
* MDO Ratio
Dummy LS
* Debt Service Ratio
Dummy LS
* Primary Balance Ratio
Dummy LS
* Real Surplus Ratio
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Table 3(ii): Estimation Results for Equation (1) (Continued) 
 
Date of Sample Yield Spread
Sample Term
Estimation Type A B A B A B
0.3023 0.6540 1.4354 1.4219 0.1410 0.8896
(0.5155) (0.4875) (0.1614) (0.1650) (1.8604) (1.7559)
-0.0039 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0047 -0.0004
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0042) (0.0033)
0.6358 -0.1067 -0.0980
(0.2429) (0.2507) (0.5748)
0.0388 -0.0062 0.1283
(0.0322) (0.0121) (0.0496)
0.2278 0.5606 0.0545 -0.0777 2.0525 2.4335
(0.3694) (0.3698) (0.5784) (0.7524) (0.8218) (0.8701)
0.7269 -8.1014 -4.6006 -4.0819 -4.0696 -17.5856
(3.8345) (5.5754) (4.4428) (4.0586) (7.6362) (9.8056)
-2.5593 -2.1160 -3.2184 -3.3107
(1.3412) (0.9926) (2.0738) (1.7760)
0.0062 0.0046 0.0016 0.0014
(0.0037) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0030)
-0.8857 -0.4204
(0.3862) (0.3010)
-0.0642 -0.1228
(0.0313) (0.0524)
0.4221 0.3208 -0.2655 -0.0356
(0.2189) (0.2143) (0.2895) (0.2987)
1.6035 12.7724 5.4724 18.1972
(3.2811) (4.2573) (7.1102) (7.0813)
-4.2734 -4.5644 -5.3388 -5.4806
(4.5744) (4.3551) (3.7241) (3.7348)
-0.0020 -0.0103 -0.0042 -0.0085
(0.0069) (0.0061) (0.0054) (0.0052)
-1.6120 -1.0050
(0.5597) (0.4072)
0.0636 -0.0131
(0.0539) (0.0513)
-0.3218 -0.4772 -0.9492 -0.7198
(0.5855) (0.6466) (0.5073) (0.4931)
35.8820 34.7996 37.4037 42.0427
(15.6443) (14.9429) (13.4963) (13.0307)
N 288 288 96 96 216 216
R-squared 0.8715 0.8651 0.9803 0.9803 0.8293 0.8271
March-31
FY2002 - FY2013 FY2002 - FY2005 FY2006 - FY2013
Maturity
Issue Amount
Primary Balance Ratio
Real Surplus Ratio
MDO Ratio
Debt Service Ratio
Dummy YS
* Maturity
Dummy YS
* Issue Amount
Dummy YS
* Real Surplus Ratio
Dummy YS
* Primary Balance Ratio
Dummy YS
* MDO Ratio
Dummy YS
* Debt Service Ratio
Dummy LS
* Maturity
Dummy LS
* Issue Amount
Dummy LS
* MDO Ratio
Dummy LS
* Debt Service Ratio
Dummy LS
* Primary Balance Ratio
Dummy LS
* Real Surplus Ratio
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We are mainly interested in the credit risk premiums of the municipal bond yield. In other 
words, we focus on the significance of credit risk indicators. The results are as follows. 
First, before the Yūbari shock, that is, FY 2002–2005, all credit risk indicators were not 
statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the credit risk premium did not exist 
in Japan’s municipal bond market until FY 2005. However, the Kyoto city dummy negatively 
affects the yield spread of municipal bonds. Kyoto is famous as the traditional capital of 
Japan and for having debt levels higher than those in other Japanese cities. This suggests that 
specific time-consistent information is important as a yield spread determinant in this term12.  
Second, after the Yūbari shock, that is, FY 2006–2013, the MDO ratio had a consistent 
impact on the yield spread, including the term after the Lehman Shock. In all four estimations, 
the MDO ratio, not multiplied by 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑌𝑆 or 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐿𝑆, is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. This suggests that investors became concerned about the credit risk of 
municipal bonds in FY 2006. In other words, the Yūbari shock led to a structural break in the 
market. 
Third, the Yūbari and Lehman Shock had a temporary impact on the yield spread. Three 
out of the four estimations show that either the intersection of the debt service ratio with 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑌𝑆 or 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐿, or both, significantly impacted the spread. In addition, three out 
of the four estimations show that one or both of the intersections of the flow-based credit 
indicator with these events are statistically significant. These results suggest that investors 
pay attention to not only the MDO ratio but also other credit risk indicators during a financial 
event. In other words, both financial events made investors more conscious about the fiscal 
soundness of local governments. 
 
 
 
                                                        
12 Here, some participants pointed out that the popularity or brand image of each local government affects, to a 
certain extent, the yield spread. Although the estimation results perhaps support this hypothesis, the factors 
determining this individual effect remain beyond the scope of this study.  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
2. Local governments used as samples are Aichi, Chiba, Fukuoka, Gunma (FY 2006–2013), Hiroshima, 
Hokkaido, Hyogo, Kumamoto (FY 2006–2013), Kyoto, Niigata, Osaka, Saitama, and Shizuoka prefectures, 
Tokyo Metropolitan, Chiba, Fukuoka, Hiroshima, Kanagawa, Kawasaki, Kitakyushu, Kobe, Kyoto, Nagoya, 
Osaka, Saitama (FY 2006–2013), Sapporo, and Yokohama cities. 
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5. Impact of new fiscal indices: Additional estimation and results 
We performed additional regressions to derive robust results for whether the credit risk 
indicators significantly impact Japan’s municipal bonds’ yield (spread). This estimation is 
based on the fact that since September 2008, MIC released four fiscal indices related to the 
fiscal condition of local governments: real deficit ratio, consolidated real deficit ratio, real 
debt service ratio13, and future burden ratio. Because investors generally use these four 
indices to evaluate the credit risk of municipal bonds, we add them as independent variables 
to Equation (1). 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑! ! = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦! ! + 𝛽! 𝐿! ! + 𝛃𝟑! 𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏 + 𝛃𝟒! 𝐱𝐢 𝐭!𝟏  +𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐿𝑆 𝛿! 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦! ! + 𝛿! 𝐿! ! + 𝛅𝟑! 𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏 + 𝛅𝟒! 𝐱𝐢 𝐭!𝟏  +𝜆! + 𝜇! + 𝜀! ! .…                      (2) 𝐱𝐢 𝐭!𝟏  contains four fiscal indices. It is lagged one year for the same reason as 𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏 . 
Other variables are almost the same as those in Equation (1). The only exception is that the 
debt service ratio is excluded from 𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏  because 𝐱𝐢 𝐭!𝟏  includes it instead. Similar to 
the estimation of Equation (1), we chose the end of December and that of March to derive 
sample data for the yield spread. This is because the revised values of the four fiscal indices 
are announced in December and the announcement timing of the other fiscal indices included 
in 𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏  remain unchanged14. In addition, the sample size of the issuers is extended to 
include data on local governments that began issuing publicly offered municipal bonds by FY 
2008. 
Table 4 shows the regression results for Equation (2). Estimation types A and B differ in 
the flow-base fiscal variable included in the estimation. For types C and D, which 
individually correspond to types A and B, we exclude future burden ratio, which is highly 
correlated with the real debt service ratio (the correlation is greater than 0.7). The estimation 
results suggest the same implication as those in Equation (1). That is, among the credit risk 
indicators, the MDO ratio is the only credit risk indicator that consistently affects yield 
spread15. Besides, a financial event, such as the Lehman Shock, is bound to increase investor 
concern about credit risk.   
                                                        
13 See Table 2 for differences in using the debt service ratio to estimate Equation (1). The real debt service ratio 
had already been used to estimate local public finance in September 2008, but was calculated until FY 2006. 
To ensure continuity, all of our estimations with Equation (1) use the debt service ratio. 
14 The preliminary results for the four fiscal indices are released around September 30. To check for robustness, 
we estimate Equation (2) using the spread for September 30. The result remains the same as that for the end 
of December (Table 4). 
15 Some results show that the consolidated real deficit ratio is sufficiently consistent. However, theoretically, it 
seems strange that only one of the four fiscal variables in 𝐱𝐢 𝐭!𝟏  is significant. Thus, we do not emphasize 
this result. 
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Table 4: Estimation Results for Equation (2) 
 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
2. Local governments used as samples are those described in the Notes appended to Table 3 as well as Gifu, 
Oita, Okayama, and Yamanashi prefectures and the cities of Hamamatsu Niigata, and Sakai. 
Date of Sample Yield Spread
Estimation Type A B C D A B C D
0.9829 0.9062 1.3793 1.3833 -0.3505 -0.7352 -0.2194 -0.6685 
(2.1134) (1.9518) (2.1599) (2.1053) (0.8147) (0.7742) (0.7210) (0.6903)
-0.0035 -0.0015 -0.0028 -0.0014 -0.0029 -0.0024 -0.0027 -0.0033 
(0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0040)
0.4700 0.3792 -0.1182 -0.1222 
(0.4461) (0.4545) (0.3367) (0.3429)
-0.0124 0.0165 0.0262 0.0474
(0.0419) (0.0346) (0.0373) (0.0283)
2.1870 2.4150 2.9651 2.8891 2.2173 2.3908 2.6351 2.6150
(1.3604) (1.4934) (0.8949) (0.9098) (1.3493) (1.4249) (0.9105) (0.9395)
-1.0032 -0.6463 -0.9528 -0.7754 -0.8126 -0.3444 -0.7482 -0.5923 
(1.2339) (1.0114) (1.2411) (1.0484) (0.9601) (0.7234) (0.9556) (0.7637)
2.2823 1.7038 2.0122 1.6853 2.4298 1.7746 2.3190 1.8144
(1.2874) (0.9815) (1.1801) (0.9769) (0.9783) (0.8947) (0.9279) (0.8706)
0.1048 0.0987 -0.0052 -0.0912 -0.0041 0.0154 -0.0064 -0.1136 
(0.1654) (0.1733) (0.1327) (0.1324) (0.1522) (0.1650) (0.0987) (0.1138)
0.0136 0.0015 0.0093 0.0007
(0.0240) (0.0248) (0.0226) (0.0236)
-16.9294 -15.6340 -14.6387 -12.8083 -4.9462 -2.7043 -4.9023 -2.6658 
(4.1741) (4.3776) (3.8091) (4.5129) (3.3323) (3.7401) (3.2597) (3.7141)
0.0039 -0.0012 0.0048 0.0005 0.0089 0.0043 0.0089 0.0078
(0.0076) (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0040) (0.0042)
-0.7458 -1.0847 -0.8136 -0.8091 
(0.7266) (0.5773) (0.3395) (0.2844)
0.1090 0.0312 0.0700 0.0188
(0.0777) (0.0658) (0.0504) (0.0360)
-1.7154 -1.6377 -1.6279 -1.3562 -0.5871 -0.5670 -0.5926 -0.3892 
(0.8076) (0.8105) (0.8588) (0.8747) (0.2940) (0.3072) (0.2908) (0.3150)
11.0623 10.5584 11.2003 11.1387 4.5617 4.2372 4.5850 4.4776
(2.5228) (2.3309) (2.3686) (2.3273) (2.3070) (2.6230) (2.3359) (2.5855)
4.9393 4.7814 4.7162 4.5584 -0.1033 0.2990 -0.0783 0.1781
(2.1124) (2.1808) (2.0517) (2.1216) (1.4505) (1.4111) (1.4557) (1.4803)
0.3440 0.2302 0.5933 0.6398 0.2439 0.1516 0.2611 0.3406
(0.4224) (0.4052) (0.2987) (0.3164) (0.2061) (0.2136) (0.1184) (0.1303)
0.0227 0.0337 0.0011 0.0142
(0.0194) (0.0178) (0.0105) (0.0108)
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204
R-squared 0.8673 0.8667 0.8625 0.8562 0.8888 0.8866 0.8885 0.8840
March-31 December-31
Maturity
Issue Amount
Real Surplus Ratio
Primary Balance
Ratio
MDO Ratio
Real Deficit Ratio
Consolidated
Real Deficit Ratio
Real Debt Service Ratio
Future Burden Ratio
Dummy LS
* Maturity
Dummy LS
* Issue Amount
Dummy LS
* Real Surplus Ratio
Dummy LS
* Primary Balance Ratio
Dummy LS
* MDO Ratio
Dummy LS
* Real Deficit Ratio
Dummy LS
* Consolidated
Real Deficit Ratio
Dummy LS
* Real Debt Service Ratio
Dummy LS
* Future Burden Ratio
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To elaborate on the latter result, for all estimations, the intersections of the real deficit ratio 
and consolidated real deficit ratio with 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐿𝑆 are statistically significant when using 
the spread for the end of March. Those of real debt service ratio are significant when the 
future burden ratio is excluded from the estimation. On the other hand, when the spread is for 
the end of December, we derive results similar to those for the real deficit and real debt 
service ratios. As for variables included in 𝐳𝐢 𝐭!𝟏 , three of the four results show that real 
surplus ratio is statistically significant at the 5% level in the case of a financial event, but not 
during a normal term. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we empirically analyze yield determinants, particularly of the yield spread 
between local governments in Japan’s municipal bond market. Our estimation results differ 
from those in Nakazato (2011) and Tanaka (2013) and the implications contrast those 
provided by earlier studies, many of which analyze the United States.  
First, during stable market periods, investors in Japan’s municipal bond market generally 
pay little or no attention to the soundness of local governments. This was supported by the 
finding that, in the first half of the 2000s, all fundamental fiscal statistics were not 
statistically significant as an independent variable in the municipal bond yield. Then, in 2006, 
the Yūbari shock caused a structural change. More specifically, the MDO ratio significantly 
impacted the yield spread. However, among the fundamental fiscal statistics, only this ratio 
was shown to have an impact. This suggests that investors tend to believe that credit risk can 
be evaluated without accounting for various fiscal statistics, such as fiscal surplus or debt 
service in each fiscal year. In other words, investors decide without fully analyzing the fiscal 
condition of the local government.  
Our results clearly differ from those of many previous studies on the U.S. municipal bond 
market, where numerous indicators, including the fundamental fiscal statistics, significantly 
impact bond yield. This suggests that there exists, or has existed until FY 2005, an 
expectation of implicit government guarantee in Japan’s municipal bond market.  
The second implication corresponds to the reaction of Japan’s municipal bond market to 
financial events. For instance, the fiscal emergency in Yūbari city and the 2007–2009 Great 
Recession clearly affected the market, especially credit risk premium. Although the 
conditions appear to be the same as those in the United States, these financial events affected 
Japan’s municipal bond market differently.  
More specifically, in the case of an important event, investors in Japan’s municipal bond 
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market changed their view of credit risk. They began recognizing that credit risks differ by 
local governments and analyzing the fiscal condition of each local government 
multi-directionally. This is supported by our estimation result that many fiscal statistics are 
statistically significant only when they are multiplied by an event dummy.  
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